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An Examination of the Stability of Cooperation in a Voluntary Collective Action: 





The term "collective action" is used to describe social situations where individuals 
put forth a coordinated effort to achieve a common goal.  Examples of collective actions 
in our everyday lives are easy to spot: a neighborhood watch group is formed to reduce 
crime, Public Television viewers make financial donations to support children's 
programming, a Habitat for Humanity house is built by community volunteers.  A 
common thread in each of these examples is that the actions of each participant are 
interdependent.  The benefits realized by each individual depend on the actions of the 
group (Sandler).  These interdependencies are the key to the success or failure of a 
collective action.   
This paper addresses the collective action problem of nonpoint-source pollution in 
a small agricultural watershed, and explores ways of preventing collective failure among 
the group of producers who farm within the watershed's boundaries.  Using a game-
theoretic representation of the collective action problem, the interaction between 
producers and their joint impact on pollutant levels within the watershed is formulated as 
a computational multi-agent system.  The multi-agent system is then used to simulate the 
evolution of collective behavior among the producers and to evaluate the effectiveness of 
selected incentive mechanisms in preventing the collapse of joint cooperation. 
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Description of the Collective Action Problem 
  The Blue Creek watershed is located in the eastern portion of Pike County, 
situated between the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers in west-central Illinois.  The 
watershed has a drainage area of 11.15 square miles (7,136 acres) with approximately 50 
percent of the land used for cropland.  The predominant crops grown are corn and 
soybeans, with some wheat also grown.  Located at the lower end of the watershed is 
Lake Pittsfield, a 222-acre impoundment with a storage volume of 2,679 acre-feet.  The 
lake was constructed in 1961 and serves as the domestic water supply for the 4,400 
residents of the City of Pittsfield, located 3 miles southwest of the lake. 
  In July 1991, atrazine was detected in Lake Pittsfield at a concentration of 13 
parts per billion (ppb), more than four times the maximum contaminant level (MCL) 
established by the Federal Safe Drinking Water Act.  The MCL was also exceeded the 
following year in September and November of 1992 (4.4 and 5.0 ppb, respectively).  In 
response to these elevated concentrations, the local farmers voluntarily agreed to 
discontinue the use of atrazine within the watershed.  As an incentive for switching to 
nonatrazine chemicals, farmers within the watershed were paid $7 per acre for 
cooperating.  For many of these farmers, atrazine was replaced by cyanazine (trade name: 
Bladex), another broad spectrum herbicide with properties similar to those of atrazine 
(both atrazine and cyanazine belong to the triazine class of herbicides).  With the 
availability of the incentive program, the switch from atrazine to cyanazine involved only 
a small increase in weed control costs for farmers.   3
Given the availability of a low cost replacement, the decision to discontinue the 
use of atrazine was perceived by local farmers to be in the best interests of the 
community.  However, on August 2, 1995, the DuPont Agrichemical Company 
announced that in response to a special review of the triazine herbicides being initiated by 
the Environmental Protection Agency, cyanazine would no longer be produced after 
December 31, 1999.  With cyanazine no longer available, herbicide alternatives to 
atrazine become significantly more expensive, often more difficult to apply, and in some 
instances less effective.  This is particularly true for farmers who must use no-till in order 
to remain compliant with soil conservation plans.  The farmers in the watershed now 
faced a dilemma: continue their voluntary moratorium on atrazine at much greater cost, 
or resume using atrazine and increase the likelihood of contributing to the contamination 
of Lake Pittsfield. 
 
Model 
The collective action problem is represented as a repeated game with imperfect 
public information.  The stage game is modeled as a simultaneous move assurance game 
played by N producers, indexed i = 1, 2,…, N, with the game repeated over t discrete 
periods.  At the beginning of each period, the producers simultaneously decide whether to 
cooperate by using corn herbicides that contains no atrazine, or defect and apply 
herbicides with atrazine as an active ingredient.  In each period, there is a small chance 
that the producer will deviate from his intended action.  These deviations, or "mistakes," 
represent random variations in optimal behavior caused by unforeseen circumstances 
(Kaniovski and Young), and are consistent with the underlying assumption that producers   4
act with bounded rationality.  The occurrence of mistakes is assumed to be perfectly 
uncorrelated across producers.  The inclusion of a mistake process in evolutionary 
models involving repeated interactions is well documented in the literature (Young; 
Kandori, Malaith and Rob).     
 Let ai denote whether producer i intends to cooperate (ai = 0) or defect (ai = 1), 
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ˆ .  It is assumed that at the beginning of the game all producers are 
initially cooperating.  This assumption relies on the notion that the cooperative 
equilibrium at the beginning of play is a focal point (Schelling) supported by the 
voluntary agreement among the producers to discontinue using of atrazine.  Once the 
producers’ decisions have been made and the actions implemented, Nature randomly 
generates the public outcome y, the concentration of atrazine in the lake.  The stochastic 
process that determines the public outcome depends on the combined actions of the 
producers and the inherent variability of environmental conditions, which is typical of 
many nonpoint source pollution problems (Segerson).  Each producer’s contribution to 
the public outcome is independent of the actions of the other producers, and depends on 
the realized action as well as the size and physical characteristics of the producer’s farm.  
Let the vector  ) , , ( 1 N a a a ¢ ¢ = ¢ K represent the action profile of the producers.  Each unique 
action profile induces a probability distribution over the public outcome y.  Let 
) ; ( Q y F represent the distribution of y, with the value of the parameter Q being a 
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where qi is the effect of producer i’s actions on the distribution of y. 
Producers are assumed unable to observe the actions of others, and must rely on 
the public outcome as an indicator of the group’s collective behavior.  At the beginning 
of each period, producers revise their beliefs about the behavior of the group as new 
information about past play becomes available.  In the repeated game, a naïve Bayesian 
learning process is used to model the revision of beliefs, which assumes that producers 
act as if they face a stationary, but unknown, distribution of opponents’ strategies.   The 
actual learning algorithm used in the model is based on an adaptation of fictitious play 
with unobservable stochastic actions (Boutilier). The learning process focuses on 
identifying the correct sampling distribution of y, and then extrapolating to arrive at a 
subjective assessment of the level of cooperation.  Producers’ beliefs are structured as a 
finite mixture distribution, which characterizes each producer’s subjective assessment of 
the true sampling distribution of y as a vector of mixing proportions associated with a 
finite mixture of component distributions.  Each component distribution represents the 
expected sampling distribution of y associated with the realization of a specific state of 
cooperation by others.  Producers use a stochastic adaptation of the fictitious-play 
learning model to revise the vector of mixing proportions over the course of play, where 
each producer is assumed to hold an initial prior belief about the true state.  We assume 
that the prior density of the mixing proportions takes the form of a Dirichlet (generalized 
beta) distribution. A quasi-Bayesian procedure developed by Smith and Makov is used in 
the model to sequentially update each producer’s beliefs.  Producers’ use their updated 
beliefs about the mixing proportions to revise their estimates of 
C
i n- ˆ , the number of other 
producers believed to be cooperating.   6
The decision environment of producers is based on the Brock and Durlauf model 
of individual choice in the presence of social interactions, where producer i’s utility 
depends directly on his own action ai and indirectly on the actions of the other N-1 
producers. Let 
C
i p and 
D
i p represent player i’s expected returns in the current period from 





i p p  for all i.  Social utility is represented by a simple linear relationship, as 
discussed in Schelling and later adopted by Ellison and Fudenberg and Brock and 
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where 
C
i m is the proportion of others believed to be cooperating, 
D
i m is the proportion of 
others believed to be defecting, and si is a dimensionless parameter indicating producer 
i’s preference for conformity.  This last parameter is a measure of the importance 
producers' place on coordinating their actions with the actions of others, with larger 
values of si indicating a greater desire to coordinate. 
 Producers are assumed to behave myopically in the sense that they seek to 
maximize utility in the current period without considering the impact of their actions on 
the course of play in future periods.  Each producer’s best response choice rule is to 
cooperate when the social utility gained through coordination exceeds the cost to 
cooperate; i.e.,  
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This decision-making process describes a threshold model (Granovetter), where the 
“threshold” for each producer is the point where the cost of an action exceeds the 
perceived benefits.  After expressing 
C
i m in terms of 
C
i n- ˆ  and rearranging (3), this choice 
rule can also be expressed in terms of 
*
i n , producer i’s threshold for cooperating, which 
identifies the critical number of other cooperators required for cooperation to be i’s best 
response: 
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This threshold will vary among producers, due to differences in the individual costs of 
adopting alternative weed control technologies.   
  Since producers respond only to their expectations about the aggregate play of 
others and not the play of each individual producer, the stage game played by producer i 
can be represented as an N-person assurance game.  The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates 
the threshold concept defined in equations (3) and (4).  The solid upward-sloping line 
shows the increasing level of utility associated with the decision to cooperate as the 
perceived level of cooperation among the others increases, while the solid downward-
sloping line is the expected utility when defection is chosen.  Cooperation is a best 
response when at least n
* others are believed to be cooperating.  The game has two pure-
strategy Nash equilibria: joint cooperation at (N-1, p
C + si ), and joint defection at (0, p
D 
+ si ).  If the expected return from cooperation decreases to p
C¢, cooperation becomes 
more costly and the expected utility function for cooperation shifts outward, as indicated 
by the dashed line.  This shift increases the cooperation threshold to n
**.    8
 
Modeling Collective Behavior as a Computational Multi-Agent System 
To study the dynamics of cooperative behavior among the producers in the 
watershed, a computational multi-agent system (MAS) was developed that simulates the 
evolution of the repeated assurance game over many time periods.  A MAS is a 
computational game environment where artificial agents are designed to interact as 
boundedly-rational utility maximizers without complete information about the other 
agents in the system (Parkes and Ungar).  MAS are particularly well suited to the study of 
cooperation among agents, where learning and adaptation are important characteristics of 
an agent’s behavior (Boutilier; Vidal and Durfee).   
The MAS is constructed in Powersim
￿ (Powersim Corp.), a system dynamics 
modeling environment capable of simulating complex systems.  The structure of the 
MAS consists of seven individual producer modules and a lake module that aggregates 
the actions of the producers to determine the realization of the public outcome (the level 
of atrazine in the lake).  Two interrelated processes are used to characterize each 
producer: the learning process and the decision process.  The learning process uses the 
latest observation of the public outcome to update a producer’s subjective beliefs about 
the actions of the other six producers.  The decision process uses these revised beliefs to 
determine a best-response action that maximizes expected utility in the current period, 
taking into account the agronomic characteristics of the producer’s farm, the crop 
production technologies available, and knowledge of the potential impact of their choices 
on the public outcome.     9
The seven “farms” used to represent each producer are contiguous clusters of 
small drainage basins delineated by an extensive Geographic Information System 
database of the Lake Pittsfield watershed (Hornbaker et al.).  The GIS provides site-
specific information about the physical and agronomic characteristics of the cropland 
within each drainage basin.  Six soil types and three erodibility classifications are used to 
characterize the variability of cropland within each farm and to assign productivity 
criteria and management constraints.  The inherent differences that exist between 
producers in terms of the cost of cooperation and the potential impact on the public 
outcome are determined solely by the variability of cropland across farms.  Table 1 
shows the distribution of cropland by erodibility class across the seven farms. 
When a producer decides to cooperate or defect, the choice of production 
technology is determined by the solution of a constrained profit-maximization problem. 
A production technology is defined by three components: a cropping pattern or rotation, a 
tillage system, and a weed control strategy.  Producers must choose between three crops 
(corn, soybeans, and winter wheat), four cropping patterns (continuous corn, corn-
soybean, corn-corn-soybean, and corn-soybean-wheat), and three tillage systems (clean 
till, mulch till, and no-till).  Weed control strategies are defined by the specific corn 
herbicide used and consist of a primary and secondary treatment.  The primary treatment 
occurs either before or at planting, while the secondary treatment, if necessary, takes 
place after the crop has emerged.  When a producer chooses to defect, his choice of 
technology is constrained only by the amount of erosion that is allowed to occur on fields 
designated as highly erodible (HEL) and exceedingly erodible (XHEL).  When 
cooperation is chosen, the producer is also limited to using weed control strategies that do   10
not rely on atrazine-based products.  In the event that a mistake occurs when cooperation 
is the intended action, atrazine is applied only as a primary treatment on HEL and XHEL 
fields where no-till is used.  These lands are the most vulnerable to unexpected weed 
pressure due to the reliance on no-till to control erosion. 
A linear programming (LP) model (Önal et al.)
 was used to identify the optimal 
production technologies associated with cooperation and defection for each individual 
producer. The objective function of the model is the maximization of total farm expected 
net returns, calculated as the difference between expected crop revenues and production 
costs.  An additional $7 per acre subsidy payment for switching to non-atrazine 
herbicides was also included in the model to imitate the effect of a water quality incentive 
program available to farmers in the watershed.  Detailed crop budgets for Illinois 
(Newton, Hornbaker and White) were used to estimate the production costs associated 
with the different crop rotations and tillage systems.  Weed control costs were based on 
1996 retail herbicide prices, and include all additional application costs.  The LP results 




D).  These results are shown in Table 2.  The numbers shown in parentheses are the 
expected losses per acre when producers cooperate, and reflect each producer’s cost of 
cooperation. 
Each farm’s potential impact on the concentration of atrazine in the lake depends 
on three factors: (1) the choice of crop and production technology, (2) the distribution of 
soils across land types, and (3) the number of acres of each land type in corn production.  
Given the inherent randomness of the hydrologic factors that affect herbicide loadings to 
surface water, the actual levels of atrazine observed in the lake vary considerably from   11
year to year.  For this reason, the atrazine pollution potentials resulting from the range of 
management and technology choices available to each farm are specified in probabilistic 
terms.  Estimates of the atrazine pollution potential for each farm were generated using a 
watershed response model that simulates the impact of soils, chemical properties, rainfall 
variability, application methods and timing, and cropping practices on the delivery and 
accumulation of atrazine in Lake Pittsfield.
1  This model provides the data necessary to 
estimate the parameters qi , which are parameters of an exponential distribution that 
describes each producer’s impact on the July 1 concentration of atrazine in the lake.
2  The 
estimated parameters for each farm are shown in Table 3.   
 
The loss of cyanazine as a substitute for atrazine is represented as a "shock" in the 
MAS.  From a modeling perspective, this shock is represented as a sudden exogenous 
change that influences the decision-making process of producers.  Following the shock, 
producers experience a significant increase in the cost of continued cooperation due to 
the additional expense of using the remaining atrazine alternatives.  These additional 
costs put upward pressure on the producer's cooperation threshold, reducing the potential 
for cooperation in the periods following the shock.  Using the MAS, a series of 
simulation experiments were conducted to examine the evolution of collective behavior 
among the producers and to evaluate the effectiveness of selected incentive mechanisms 
in preventing the collapse of joint cooperation after the removal of cyanazine.  An 
experiment consists of 100 independent simulation runs of the MAS.  Each run involves 
                                                 
1 A detailed description of the watershed response model, while beyond the scope of this paper, is available 
from the authors upon request.  
2 July 1 was selected as the time of year when elevated atrazine concentrations were most likely to be found 
in the lake (Spalding et al.)   12
20 discrete time-steps, with each time-step representing a single interaction of the stage 
game.  The first eight interactions of each run simulate group behavior with cyanazine 
available.
3  Cyanazine is then removed in the ninth period, and the collective behavior of 
the group is allowed to evolve over the remaining eleven periods of play.  The likelihood 
of the emergence of joint cooperation among the group is measured as the proportion of 
runs where play has converged to the cooperative equilibrium by the twentieth period.  
Given the uncertainty about producers’ intrinsic desire to coordinate their actions with 
others, the experiments were performed over a range of possible values for the 
conformity preference parameter, where producers are assumed to hold identical 
preferences.  A preliminary analysis was performed to establish a lower bound for the 
conformity preference parameter.  By necessity, this value must be consistent with 
producers’ observed behavior, and large enough to yield convergence to the cooperative 
equilibrium within the first eight periods of play.   This preliminary analysis identified a 
lower bound for the conformity preference parameter equal to three. 
 
Results 
The first series of simulation experiments examined the effect of increasing the 
level of subsidy payments on the probability of joint cooperation, with the increased 
payments programmed to coincide with the shock.  The results of these experiments are 
summarized in Figure 2.  When preferences are equal to the lower bound of three, a 
subsidy payment of at least $16 per corn acre is required for joint cooperation to continue 
after the shock.  At the current $7 per acre payment level of the incentive program, joint 
                                                 
3 This is approximately the length of time between the initial agreement among the producers in 1992 and 
the DuPont’s removal of cyanazine from the market in 1999.   13
cooperation is expected to continue with 90 percent probability only for values of the 
conformity preference parameter at or above 6.5. 
While joint cooperation can be sustained by simply increasing the subsidy 
payments to producers, the appeal of this approach from a policy maker's perspective will 
ultimately depend on the implementation cost involved.  At the lower bound of the 
conformity preference parameter, the annual cost of implementing this program would 
increase by $9 per corn acre, more than twice the original payment levels.  As an 
alternative to a pure subsidy, we introduce a multiple instrument incentive scheme that 
combines a subsidy payment with a penalty that depends on the amount by which the 3 
ppb MCL is exceeded.  This is similar in spirit to a payment/penalty system described by 
Segerson.  In Segerson's model, a tax/subsidy payment proportional to the amount by 
which ambient water quality is above/below a specified cutoff level is used in 
conjunction with an additional fixed penalty that is assessed whenever ambient water 
quality exceeds the cutoff level.  Given the uncertainty of ambient pollution levels 
resulting from nonpoint source emissions, this payment scheme motivates polluters to opt 
for higher levels of abatement than would otherwise be chosen when incentives are based 
solely on emissions.   
In the MAS, penalties are based on the simple step function shown in Figure 3.  
While the specification of this function is purely arbitrary, the relationship is based on the 
underlying premise that the social costs of atrazine use are an increasing function of the 
ambient atrazine concentration.  The actual amount of the penalty in dollars per acre is 
the relative penalty multiplied by an adjustable policy parameter in the MAS.  Producers 
form expectations about their expected liability under the penalty based on a subjective   14
assessment of the probability that atrazine concentrations will exceed the MCL.  This 
subjective assessment depends on the producers' own estimated impact on the sampling 
distribution of atrazine in the lake as well as their current estimate of the combined 
impact of the other producers.  As long as producers recognize that their actions impact 
the distribution of the public outcome, the threat of a penalty will reduce a producer’s 
effective cost of cooperation, lowering the threshold for cooperation and improving the 
potential for cooperation as a best response. 
Figure 4 shows that when preferences are equal to the lower bound, there is a 
distinct shift in the potential for cooperative outcomes once subsidy levels reach $13.  To 
the left of the $13 level, producers do not share a common incentive structure, and joint 
cooperation becomes possible (though with less than 90 percent probability) only when 
penalties are greater than $4 per acre.  At the $13 level and above, each producer’s 
incentive structure is compatible with an assurance game, and joint cooperation observed 
at the 90 percent probability level is attainable.   
Our results also indicate that producers do not respond uniformly to the penalty.  
With a $7 subsidy payment, there are three unique incentive structures exhibited among 
the seven producers, as shown in Figure 5.  Farms A and B defect unconditionally when 
penalties are below $9, and then switch to a Prisoner's Dilemma incentive structure at 
penalty levels above $9.  Eventually both will cooperate unconditionally when penalties 
are sufficiently high, although for Farm A this point occurs at a much higher penalty.   At 
$8, Farm C switches from unconditional defection to a transitional state, where defection 
is the best response when the majority are either cooperating or defecting.  Cooperation is 
chosen when the actions of the group are split.  For lack of a better term, we refer to this   15
state as a waver game.   Above $8, Farm C switches to a Prisoner's Dilemma before 
cooperating unconditionally at penalties greater than $12.  Farm D switches from 
unconditional defection to an assurance game when penalties are greater than $6, and 
cooperates unconditionally above $8.  This divergence in behavior among producers is 
due to differences in both farm size and the impact that atrazine use has on the sampling 
distribution of the public outcome.   Of the farms shown in Figure 5, Farm A has the 
fewest acres and the smallest impact on the atrazine concentration in the lake.  When 
penalties are low and cooperation among the others is high, the additional penalty that a 
small farm would expect to pay while defecting may not be large enough to make 
cooperation a best response.  In effect, the penalty targets producers having the greatest 
impact on water quality.   
Figure 6 summarizes how the payment and penalty interact to influence the 
underlying incentive structure of the collective action problem facing the seven 
producers.  Each row indicates the mixture of incentive structures within the given 
penalty range.  For example, when a $9 penalty is used with a $7 subsidy payment, five 
producers will have an incentive structure consistent with the Prisoner's Dilemma, while 
two producers will cooperate unconditionally.  The long run equilibrium in this case is 
mixed, with two cooperators and five defectors. When the subsidy payment is $13, all 
producers are playing an assurance game, with joint cooperation and joint defection as 
the dual long-run equilibria.  These results raise the following question: Can atrazine 
concentrations over time be controlled below the MCL with mixed equilibria outcomes, 
or is joint cooperation required?   16
To answer this question, consider the two graphs displayed in Figure 7.  The open 
triangles indicate the frequency of MCL violations at different penalty levels, while the 
open circles show the average payment per acre received by producers (net any penalties 
incurred) in the periods following the shock.  When a $35 penalty is used with a $7 
payment, the probability of violating the MCL in any given year is less than 0.05, and 
producers receive an average payment of about $3 per cropland acre.  Referring back to 
Figure 5, this penalty-payment combination results in a game structure where the two 
producers with the smallest impact on the lake (Farms A and F) play a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, while the remaining five producers cooperate unconditionally.  An equivalent 
MCL violation frequency can be achieved when a $13 subsidy payment is offered in 
combination with a $4 penalty.  This results in all seven producers playing an assurance 
game and receiving an average effective payment of $5.67 per cropland acre.   
 
Summary 
This paper addresses the collective action problem of nonpoint-source pollution 
control in a small agricultural watershed.  At issue is the stability of cooperative behavior 
among a group of farmers, who have voluntarily agreed to discontinue their use of the 
herbicide atrazine due to high concentrations of the herbicide being detected in a local 
water supply. Continued cooperation among the group is threatened by the cancellation 
of cyanazine, an inexpensive and widely used alternative to atrazine.  With cyanazine no 
longer available, the farmers face a significant increase in weed control costs if they 
continue to use products that do not contain atrazine.  Is cooperation among the farmers   17
still possible despite the increased cost of cooperation?  This paper explores the economic 
and behavioral factors that influence the collective outcome of this social dilemma.   
Our results suggest that without additional incentives, farmers are likely to 
abandon their voluntary agreement and resume their use of atrazine within the watershed.  
We then demonstrated how a combination of policy instruments could be used to alter the 
underlying game configuration of the collective action problem, resulting in cooperative 
outcomes.  An ambient-based penalty, when used in conjunction with a subsidy payment, 
is shown to produce divergent incentive structures that shift the classification of the 
collective action problem away from a coordination problem with two equilibria to a 
mixed configuration with multiple game structures and many possible equilibria.  This 
result has important consequences in terms of the evolution of producer behavior and the 
set of possible collective outcomes.  The analysis concludes with an example, which 
demonstrates that joint cooperation is not a prerequisite to the realization of socially 
desirable outcomes.  By thoughtfully selecting the combination of subsidy payment and 
ambient penalty, a policy maker can manipulate the underlying incentive structure of the 
collective action, whereby producers with the smallest impact on water quality choose to 
defect while all others cooperate. 
Our examination of cooperative, rather than non-cooperative, behavior among 
polluting firms represents a significant contribution to the study of nonpoint-source 
pollution problems.  Another contribution is our representation of collective behavior as a 
repeated game with learning, where interdependent firms adjust their actions over time in 
response to their evolving expectations about the play of others.  This framework could 
easily be applied to a broad range of social settings involving interdependencies among   18
individual agents.  We also explore the role of multiple policy instruments as a means of 
encouraging the emergence and stability of cooperation.  An finally, our use of a multi-
agent system as a platform for simulating the evolution of collective behavior represents 
a further example of the use of computational methods to enhance the analysis of 
complex economic systems.   19








erodible (XHEL)  Total Cropland 
Farm   ------------------------------------------------------Acres  --------------------------------------------------- 
A  269.2  71.9  0.0  341.1 
B  341.8  235.3  43.0  620.1 
C  422.6  30.5  92.2  545.3 
D  436.1  99.4  164.9  700.4 
E  505.4  68.0  163.6  737.0 
F  124.3  54.4  38.9  217.6 
G  216.8  82.4  100.9  400.1 





Table 2.  Farm-level expected net returns and income losses resulting from cooperation and defection. 
 
Cyanazine available  Cyanazine unavailable 
DEFECT  COOPERATE  DEFECT  COOPERATE 
Farm   -------------------------------   Expected net returns per acre ($)  ----------------------------- 
             
A  164.42  163.51  (0.91)  164.42  156.38  (8.04) 
B  151.89  150.14  (1.75)  151.84  143.46  (8.38) 
C  139.21  138.40  (0.81)  139.10  131.44  (7.66) 
D  145.87  144.33  (1.54)  145.82  137.79  (8.03) 
E  139.30  138.06  (1.24)  139.22  131.40  (7.82) 
F  152.24  150.36  (1.88)  152.22  143.95  (8.27) 
G  140.53  138.84  (1.69)  140.48  132.57  (7.91) 
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Table 3.  Estimated parameter values describing the impact of each producer on the distribution of July 1 
concentration of atrazine in the lake. 
 
  Cyanazine available  Cyanazine unavailable 
DEFECT  COOPERATE
a  DEFECT  COOPERATE
a   
Farm  D
i q  
M
i q  
D
i q  
M
i q  
             
A  0.596  0.176  0.596  0.176 
B  0.740  0.735  1.316  0.735 
C  0.407  0.281  1.145  0.281 
D  1.182  0.583  1.920  0.583 
E  1.023  0.514  1.887  0.514 
F  0.402  0.208  0.594  0.208 
G  0.776  0.397  1.142  0.397 
         
  Q Q
D = 5.126  Q Q
M = 2.958  Q Q
D = 8.6  Q Q
M = 2.958 
         





Figure 1.  The expected utility of producer i when choosing to cooperate (defect) as an increasing 
(decreasing) linear function of the number of others believed to be cooperating.  The dashed line 
shows the effect of a decrease in the expected return from cooperation, resulting in a higher 
cooperation threshold at n





































Figure 2.  Joint cooperation as a function of conformity preference and the level of subsidy payment.  The 
light gray region identifies combinations where joint cooperation is observed with 90 percent 
probability, while joint defection  dominates in the dark gray portion of the chart.  The white 
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Figure 4.  Collective outcomes as a function of the subsidy payment and penalty when the value of the 
conformity preference parameter is set equal to three.  The hatched region indicates where 
producers always cooperate, while the light gray region shows where joint cooperation occurs with 
greater than 90 percent probability.  The white region shows where joint cooperation is possible 
but with less than 90 percent probability.  The dark gray and black regions show where joint 






Farm A  Others believed to be cooperating    Farm B  Others believed to be cooperating 
Penalty  0  1  2  3  4  5  6    Penalty  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
0-8  D  D  D  D  D  D  D    0-8  D  D  D  D  D  D  D 
9  C  C  C  C  D  D  D    9  C  C  C  C  C  D  D 
10-13  C  C  C  C  C  D  D    10-15  C  C  C  C  C  C  D 
14-61  C  C  C  C  C  C  D    16+  C  C  C  C  C  C  C 
62+  C  C  C  C  C  C  C                   
 
Farm C  Others believed to be cooperating    Farm D  Others believed to be cooperating 
Penalty  0  1  2  3  4  5  6    Penalty  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
0-7  D  D  D  D  D  D  D    0-6  D  D  D  D  D  D  D 
8  D  D  C  C  C  D  D    7  D  D  D  D  D  C  C 
9-12  C  C  C  C  C  C  D    8  D  D  C  C  C  C  C 
13+  C  C  C  C  C  C  C    9+  C  C  C  C  C  C  C 
                                 
 
Figure 5.  The best response actions of producers when ambient-based penalties are used in combination 
with subsidy payments of $7 per corn acre, where cooperation = C and defection = D.   
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$7 subsidy payment    $13 subsidy payment 
  Game structure      Game structure 
Penalty  D  W  PD  A  C    Penalty  D  W  PD  A  C 
0-5  7            0-6        7   
6  6      1      7        5  2 
7  5      2      8+          7 
8  3  2    2                 
9-12      5    2               
13-15      4    3               
16-61      2    5               
62-72      1    6               
73+          7               
 
 
Figure 6.  Evolution of the collective action problem at $7 and $13 subsidy payments when the producers' 
game structure is influenced by the level of the penalty.  Each cell indicates the number of 
producers having a given game structure, where the game structures are classified as: defect 





























Figure 7.  Simulation results showing the effect of subsidy payment and penalty combinations on the 
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